Tokenomics: $LUNAR & $VOX

General
#40

I understand why they wouldn’t want there to be a penalty for leaving. As much as it can be a single account decision it can also be a protection when many quit if there is a malicious proposal. I must admit that initially I saw ragequit as an action that didn’t much consider the mission of the dao, but now I see that this can ensure the mission with the ability to ragequit should something endanger that mission. A tax/fee in this sense is not encouraging to take action to protect the dao and if we want it to have such a function we should consider to not have a fee, though I agree that the question still remain.

1 Like
#41

I generally like the idea that anyone with their own agency can join the DAO - ie. get LUNAR and stake for VOX. The issuing of shares is too restricted imo. On the other hand if someone request to join the dao and to be issued shares, it is also coming with more of a commitment.

1 Like
#42

Here is an article on Moloch v3.

Got in touch with Ameen who is one of the Moloch pioneers. Summarizing some of these questions on their infra, rage quit, ragequit penalty/fee, permissioned DAO vs anonymity etc.

We can make a list so once we get into messaging we will have it all ready and take as little Ameens time as possible.

I have to read and ask Ameen on the reasoning behind the NOT charging rage quitting tax and the philosophy of permission only DAO to understand it better from that point (not just technically).

#43

I like that we holding onto the Squad and Community. Sometimes people confuse freedom and anti-authoritarianism with structurelessness. Whereas we talking about the commitment and responsibility, skin in the game. I think this can be one of the ideas how to approach it @sadar.

#44

Also a friend and LunarDAO close ally was sending me a DM with a suggestion to look into this:

#45

I think these are some good ideas. The article “How the devil do I use a Moloch DAO?” also speaks in #3 about what Lunar in MolochDAO fashion could look like.

The previous article to this one: “What the devil are Moloch DAOs, and why should you care?” explains the basics in a very accessible language.

Combined with the chapter on “Asset management” from “MCV Whitepaper” one get a really solid overview and a usecase of MolochDAOs.

1 Like
#46

Hey everyone. Past two weeks were full of summarizing all the feedback and research on proposed options.

Reading, discussions and many phone calls with builders and other investment DAOs.

We are finalizing a proposal based on Moloch V3 design. We will needs all your hands on the deck to make sure the final architecture is as democratically decided upon as possible.

Gonna share the proposal within some hours here.

#47

We summed up all different pros & cons and came up with two final options. The proposed Moloch v3 design (with different options) is shared on the github, so any changes are archived.

I will also share the initial text here for simplicity, but won’t paste the whole thing with every update.

Looking forward for your all’s feedback!!!

#48

LunarDAO Architecture

THIS DOCUMENT IS A PROPOSAL AND REFERENCE FOR THE COMMUNITY FEEDBACK AND DISCUSSION!

Resources & References

General

LunarDAO aims to function as an INVESTMENT FUND INTO PRIVACY PROJECTS & ANONYMITY TOOLING, a squad wealth based DAO spreading Lunarpunk narrative & philosophy and creating possibilities for education by building research/wiki and support educational processes where people master the skills in the field and bring value back to the ecosystem.

Based on the discussions with the allies & the community, the most feasible way for the LunarDAO architecture to meet its aim, seems to be MolochDAO V3. The contracts have much more optionality on both the initial setup and throughout the DAO life time in comparison to Moloch V2. V3 is also easier to set up and launch, possibly using existing UI and implement changes on the fly, in more democratic manner (based on community discussions and squad vote).

  • Multisig Gnosis Safe and Moloch v3 on chain execution are compatible → the DAO can be setup on top of the Gnosis safe multisig. Start with the trust (and more secure) setup and plan a roadmap milestone to discuss, propose (LIP) and vote on a multi-sig removal in a forseeable future → full trustless setup.
  • RageQuit is included in this design.
  • Setup minimum retention 25% - if 75% of shares are ragequitted, the proposal will fail automatically as the original circumstances when the proposal was submitted, including access to funds, changes dramatically.
  • LunarDAO Squad is based on owning DAO “Shares” - governance power, LunarDAO community is based on the ownership of “Loot”.
    • Shares & Loot can be represented by: $VOX = LunarDAO squad shares and $LUNAR = LunarDAO community loot.

Terminology

Governance

  • Community: People holding loot (or $LUNAR), active in the DAO, non-voting power
  • Squad: DAO members holding shares, voting power
  • Sentinels: Eight guardians (multi-sig) of the DAO treasury
  • Stewards: Anonymous core-team/founders of the DAO, securing operations (can be exchanged, archived, scaled up)
  • Committees: Working groups with a specific focus (research, media, education)

Threshold protocols

Note: In all cases DAO participants/members are encouraged to setup anonymized wallets before joining the DAO!

The option on restricted governance access/ Squad membership refers to terms “Social zk-proof”, “Squad invites” and “Minimal Tribute” as possible threshold protocols:

Social zk-proof

  • An anon community member shares a proposal to join the Squad (whether minimal tribute or a short introduction to be presented - yet to be defined).
  • Only an existing Squad member can submit a proposal for a new member on chain, which serves as a Squad vouch without sharing further knowledge who knows who.
  • The rest of the Squad reads the proposal (and or the initial tribute) and vote on the new member.
  • Every new member is encouraged (doesn’t have to) to choose a fully anon identity.
  • Members can change their forum/chat nicks at will, by which the connection to their wallets are broken.
  • This system needs to be worked out well to prevent network mapping (socially and on-chain).

Squad Invites

  • Every Squad member can add a new Squad member (can be combined with a minimal tribute option).
  • The number of invites per Squad member is limited (or limited per time period) → incentive to chose wisely.
  • When adding a new member a short introduction (yet to be defined) including information about initial tribute shall be shared in the Squad.
  • Adding a new member is not instant (ie. one week) which allows others to propose to GuildKick the host or a RageQuit themselves, if they disagree with adding the new member.
  • The system is similar to Social zk-proof, without voting and needs to be worked out to prevent the same risks.

Minimal Tribute

  • A size of a minimal tribute is defined by the Squad.
  • Every new member to join the Squad must escrow a minimal tribute to the DAO treasury.
  • When a new member joins the DAO Squad, the tribute will be exchanged for equal amount of shares assigned to the new member.

The above mentioned thresholds can be further developed and combined together.

Questions

Keep in mind that if we were to choose Moloch V3 model, the questions are related for the setup on launch with a possibility to change many of these settings later on. Those changes, or at least a discussion about them can be included in the roadmap, so different options in different phases of the DAO life cycle are already considered.

  1. What shall the relation be between the Community and the Squad on Governance (social) level?

    a) The Squad is (low threshold) permission based or,
    b) Completely permissionless

Both have advantages and disadvantages:

Table 1: Restricted & Permissionless setup; Pros vs Cons

Restricted DAO Permissionless DAO
PROs CONs PROs CONs
Size vs Quality Mission aligned Squad Slower ramp up No threshold Ape pump-dump risk
Anonymity None Need a vouching system More anon friendly Needs a system to prevent whale manipulation
RageQuit Squad members are more involved in the governance None Easy re-entry RageQuit possibly endlessly, can be easier to manipulate
GuildKick Any member can propose others to be kicked out None None GuildKick process is a complex process, hard to kick ppl out in this setup
Operation overhead Possible to use the Onboarder More work to onboard ppl manually Less work with the setup Hard to GuildKick & keep the DAO aligned with the mission

  1. What shall be the relation between $LUNAR (shares) & $VOX (loot) on economical and technical level.

    a) Shall $VOX (shares) be non-transferable and $LUNAR (Loot) liquid, or alternatively both liquid or both non-transferable?
    b) Shall $LUNAR as loot be introduced at launch, later/after launch or not at all?
    c) Alternatively at launch: shall $LUNAR be sold on the market and $VOX be non-transferable, granting an access to a permissioned squad?
    d) What would be the ratio, and exchange system between $LUNAR and $VOX be in such setup and what is the best mechanism to prevent $VOX suffer the outcome of $LUNAR market volatility? (ie. If we use a system of burning LUNAR to acquire VOX, how do we calculate the ratio?)
    e) Alternatively shall $LUNAR be introduced later on as a DAO community token which is not connected to neither shares nor loot of the DAO?

Table 2: Transferable & Non-transferable tokens; Pros vs Cons*

VOX (Governance/Shares) LUNAR (Community/Loot)
PROs CONs PROs CONs
Transferable Everyone can buy in, possible more organic decentralization Governance token for investment DAO can suffer under whale speculations, bad distribution, centralization & manipulation Liquid & accessible, scales up the community (in case of non-transferable VOX) the relation in between the tokens has to be more sophisticated (ratio, burn mechanism)
Non-Transferable The DAO decides on the shares distribution, the token serves the governance, the value = treasury net higher threshold, wallet address needed Under the control of the DAO Limits the access to the community, slows down the launch
  1. Do we want the Squad members to be able to RageQuit even when they voted yes? (In Moloch V2 this was not possible, in V3 it is)
  2. What’s the best launching model to reach as fair distribution as possible?
  3. If LunarDAO is to start with (low threshold) permissioned governance (share based), what has to be done to ensure that people will join on launch?
  4. How to keep the core-team operational?

Points of Consideration

Adding up all the PROs and CONs gives us better understanding of possibilities and consideration for the best design to be chosen for LunarDAO launch.

1. Permissionless vs Restricted

Fully Permissionless

The DAO governance is inclusive, the community scales up faster and importantly - it is anon friendlier by default. However, if burning $LUNAR = $VOX (shares) and RageQuit has 0 fees (which we prefer!), people can move in between Community (based on loot) and the governing Squad (based on shares) permissionlessly and without any commitment (vouch threshold entry, minimum tribute, or the undesired locking system). The GuildKick becomes overly complicated (nearly impossible). This challenges some of the main properties of Moloch design and may bring risks to the DAO. It can impact how seriously privacy investors may want to engage. An option would be to look into a combination with non-transferable shares.

Restricted Governance

Vouching system means that only Squad members can propose and vote on new Squad member, this brings a challenge to anonymity (read on “social zk-proof” below). On-boarding new members brings more overhead operations. Membership can be restricted by vouch/vote, tribute size, or an invite system (read below in “Squad invite”). The DAO ramp up would be much slower and likely exclude people who don’t already have existing connections to the network forming around the DAO in the beginning (unless a system is based on “Tribute minimum” - read below). Restricted governance puts in risk the DAO outreach and growth, however if done well and for a limited period of time (later proposal + vote) such design can defend the DAO Squad from a mission creep and manipulation as it defines the commitment from speculation and allows for a guild kick.

2. Transferable vs Non-Transferable (Loot & Share/ $LUNAR & $VOX)

Based on the mission and community feedback, we believe that the governance token (shares/$VOX) shall NOT be transferable as it represents the governance responsibility and it’s value shall represent the shared DAO net value, not a market speculative price.

Transferable Loot

If $LUNAR == Loot (non governing representation of DAO shared value) → tradable on the market (and burning LUNAR gives VOX/voting power) → the price of $LUNAR is open to market speculation → red light for privacy investors. To prevent that the relation between the Loot and Shares must be volatile as well (while a share price is defined: DAO net value / # shares).

Non-Transferable Loot

Loot as Shares stays non-transferable, account bound. Loot value = shares value, but Loot does not allow for voting. $LUNAR can be either a symbol representing the non-transferable Loot or serve as a community speculative token, with a possibility to burn and mint equal value of non-transferable loots (or shares in permissionless setup). In such case $LUNAR tokenomics (launch and distribution) must be decided by the DAO Squad.

FINAL OPTIONS

Let’s summarize the discussion into two possibile models.

Option 1: Conservative Launch - quality over size

The DAO kick-off is slower, but more sincere, based on mission alignment, commitment and step by step optimization and growth.

  • The DAO Squad has a low threshold permissioned membership. Based on “Social zk-proof”; a pseudonymous vouching system or a combination of “Squad Invites” and “Minimal Tribute”.
  • Restricted launch with a plan that after some time/# members a discussion + vote takes place to change using the Onboarder or go fully permissionless.
  • The shares/$VOX are distributed to Squad members based on their tribute size.
  • Shares are represented by $VOX and are non-transferable.
  • Loot is:
    • a) Represented by $LUNAR and can be acquired by anyone (either at launch as it was planned in the v1 tokenomics or in another way)
      • If $LUNAR in place from launch: Community member accepted as a Squad member burns their $LUNAR into $VOX
    • b) Alternatively the Loot is also non-transferable and represents non-governance shares of RageQuitted Squad members - similar to Moloch v2.
      • In such case Loot != $LUNAR (loot = $VOX which has been ragequitted). $LUNAR launch and function is instead integrated in the roadmap as per #2, e).
  • Ragequit based design, with no fee.
  • GuildKick included (malicious actors can be proposed to be kicked out of the DAO - force a RageQuit).
  • The DAO is built on top of the existing multi-sig safe (for the reasons explained). A discussion and vote to remove the trusted element will take place after agreed period (ie after 3 months counted from the launch).
  • Anyone can submit proposals, only holders of $VOX/shares can vote.
    • Alternatively only holders of the loot or shares ($LUNAR or $VOX) can submit a proposal.
  • The DAO is launched on existing contracts and UI by DAOhaus.
  • Further upgrades and customization will be discussed in the community and voted upon.
  • A management/admin fee of 0.5% is calculated and sent to core-team multi-sig wallet once every 3 months (ETH: 0xAb501a8Eb58c9780eb04D683feB504fcE391A2DD)
  • For extra costs/expenses such as dev, research, education etc a LIP is submitted and voted upon.

Option 2: Inclusive Launch & Anon maxi (at any cost)

The DAO token and governance power is accessible to anyone, allows for faster community scale up. Such setup allows for governance token speculation which can suffer both in terms of price as well as the poor quality of governance decisions and possible manipulation.

  • Permissionless, no threshold to become a member.
  • Anyone can get $LUNAR (loot).
  • To get $VOX (shares), burn $LUNAR.
    • or option b): To get $VOX stake $LUNAR into the treasury.
  • Possible: Early exit penalty: the member exits with a slightly smaller amount than at entry (done by a time escrow of decided % of their tribute which unlocks after agreed time period) - non desirable as it’s a risk for privacy investors.
    • or option b): No fee for exiting, assumption that it is unlikely that RageQuit will be generally misused. Change this through proposal if misuse occur.
  • People can RageQuit and rejoin for eternity.
  • No GuildKick is applicable in permissionless setup as the assets can be moved around easily. To circumvent that requires freezing minting and preventing token to be transferred and only then proposing a GuildKick.
  • Anyone can submit proposals, only holders of $VOX can vote.
  • The DAO is launched on existing contracts and UI by DAOhaus.
  • Further upgrades and customization will be discussed in the community and voted upon.
  • A management/admin fee of 0.5% is calculated and sent to core-team multi-sig wallet once every 3 months (ETH: 0xAb501a8Eb58c9780eb04D683feB504fcE391A2DD)
  • For extra costs/expenses such as dev, research, education etc a LIP is submitted and voted upon.

Conclusion

LunarDAO is an anonymity-first organization. However our mission is bigger than that. From the option 1 and option 2 (and anything between and beyond) the largest contradictions to resolve are in remaining as anon as it is possible (on ETH) while staying true to the aims of the DAO. Looking into investment DAOs based on Moloch V1 & V2, listening to the allies in chats and multiple meetings with builders, we believe that LunarDAO should not kick-off as an experiment, instead start on well tested mechanisms.

However Moloch V3 seems to be the best fitting design because of its optionality - which allows for a 100% permissionless DAO - the implementation of such logic for a mission aligned investment DAO was not tested. If LunarDAO were the first one to experiment with the new models, it shall be done on a strong foundation, based on a proper community discussion and preferably Squad vote, which is impossible to have before the DAO itself is well established.

If we were to choose option 1, the threshold needs to be minimal, non-doxxing and the protocol must be thought through to protect the members. We have already recommended in our docs to use Aztec or TornadoCash mixers, ensure network protection and change RPC as a basis to join LunarDAO.

If we were to base the launch on option 2, the protection against governance speculation and manipulation must be put in place and the (dis-)ability of an easy GuildKick well evaluated.

To be or not to be…

However there are many important details to decide upon, giving all the pros and cons, the main discussion is in between the presented options or their timing:

A) Shall LunarDAO launch on a variation of OPTION 1 and eventually change towards OPTION 2 based on future voting (as a phase 2)?

or:

B) Shall LunarDAO launch straight on a variation of OPTION 2?

As decided in LunarDAO Objectives & Key Results for February the DAO structure shall be finished and approved by the community by March 6th. To leave time for the final tweaks and the deployment, we would like to have the DAO structure agreed upon by February 26th.

LET’S DECIDE THE BEST WAY TOGETHER, JOIN THE DISCUSSION!

SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF LUNARDAO ARCHITECTURE!

2 Likes
#49

DAOHaus info on proposals, adding new members and ragequit

Source: https://daohaus.club/docs/users/summon

Questions:

Do we also include this in the governance? (if Molochv3 is an accepted proposal):

"Proposal Deposit: Used to protect against member spam. Deposited by user when sponsoring a proposal. Returned to their internal balance (minus processing reward if applicable) after the proposal is processed.

Proposal Reward: Used to reward members who process proposals. Originally meant to reimburse those spending gas to process proposals, so not as necessary on networks like xDAI and Polygon."

Ragequit:

Ragequit is easy. the member can choose how many Shares to ragequit.

Add proposal:

Add new member:

Includes:

  • Proposal title
  • Short description
  • Shares requested
  • Token tribute

In Daohaus to become a member the proposal need to be sponsored by an existing member (vouch) and then everyone need to vote on the proposal.
This is aligning both with the proposal of a vouch system as well as minimum tribute.

#50

Couldn’t really find this discussed anywhere else, but the multisig 5 sentinels but 3 anon core team members. How can anyone know the three anons are not the same person?

And how do we know the 5 sentinels are not also core anon members?

#51

  1. No comment yet. I really am not sure which is better, restricted vs permissionless

  2. I think transferability allows for the most flexiblity in tokenomic design. The organic decentralization aspect is most important here.

  3. Yes Ragequit even when yes

  4. Launching model is defined as what?

  5. We have to invest in projects that privacy-focused communities care about.

  6. Core team needs to be allocated a salary after raise. Core team salary should be figured out first before budgeting for contributors.

#52

Good point to raise. We can never be 100% sure with anon multi-sig members. There was a brief description in the ‘Why Anon’ post: LunarDAO – The New Lunarpunk Squad

To start, this choice wasn’t easy. We realized that working under pseudonyms means people don’t recognize you, and therefore you start with zero reputation. It doesn’t matter whether you’re big and respected in your field - nobody knows that it’s you. This condition deprives you of the credibility you may have previously built, and puts you in the position of redoing everything all over again. It is basically a fresh start full of challenges.

There is no reputation to work off without identifying markers

It doesn’t directly address the potential of collusion, but the 5 public sentinel members with their reputation, should alleviate potential concern, but still relies on a base layer of trust

There is the possibility of moving away 100% and managing it all on-chain

Our multisignatures are from multiple continents and jurisdictions. This decision is taken to ensure initial trust based on several well known pseudonyms in the space who remain decentralized. An issue we had to address on the launch is to prevent a possibility of large actors (ie FED) to buy a mojority of $LUNAR and attack the treasury. We are happy to find and deploy proposals of a full on-chain implementation post-launch if this thread can be addressed well.

#53

If the 5 public Sentinels were the core-team members at the same time would create a risk exposure to them and the core-team in the first place, as well as to the DAO.

Proposals can be made to shift this ratio to a degree that 1 core-member stays in for example. Ie if you @polarpunklabs wish to join on that responsibility, we can discuss this.

#54

I am more or less just registering that the presence of three anon team members means we can never be sure the project won’t be rugged. This is just the brute realpolitik.
We can’t really be sure it’s even three people or just one person or one or more of the sentinels, etc. It is even possible the 5 sentinels were chosen precisely because they have good reps paper over the three anon issue.
Do I believe this is the case, very unlikely in a lunarpunk activist context, but since it has not raised any more worries I would just consider my point here a minor view.
I think multisig is better than on-chain. Better to have a social layer.

LunarDAO UPDATES & ANNOUNCEMENTS
#55

Your points are valid ofc. I will try to let some fulmoon light into this:

  1. There have been people with a solid reputation who on TW and particularly in chats (some of which the community here - early Squad/allies may be part of) shared that they - however not part of LunarDAO - vouch for the core-team.

  2. The call out for sentinels was also opened in some chats with solid number of allies and minds alike with the aims of this DAO.

  3. If the different inputs of @dcat , @zero, @sadar, @violett, @ramla and me (including the language expression) and the the work behind the entire DAO comes out as being done by one person (+ the speed this person would need to switch nicks during community meetings etc) - we shall reflect what did we do wrong that 6 stewards job (+ 7 occasional externals) comes out as a one person job.

  4. If you @polarpunklabs are the pseudonymous who I think and you would be willing to address this concern by taking a Sentinel role instead of one Steward on the list, I would welcome the proposal and will bring it to Monday community meeting. Believe such proposal would be found positive.

I know all 4. points are social - trust based, but that’s the role of the multi-sig. We can scale the Steward presence down to 1 or remove the trust layer completely.

2 Likes
#56

i think option 1 makes the most sense because of the permissioned setup. Permissionless is too risky in the beginning imo because we have no reference point for how things work under our system.

#57

We had another call with the builders from Moloch and DAOHaus and have a solution for a restricted Squad with permitionless entry.

Scetching up the proposal based on the existing options.

1 Like
#58

interesting. Ok looking forward to hearing it

#59

Open source Sybil protection API.

https://twitter.com/gitcoinpassport/status/1627716829446832128

No need to connect socials. It can tell from your on-chain activity if you are real or other non-doxxing metrics.