Table 1: Fundamental approaches: Portfolio & Syndicate
FUND MANAGEMENT – Design Essentials
Portfolio/ investment club
Syndicate
Description:
All the assets in the treasury are pooled together as a common portfolio. Each share despite the time of purchase represents the same value (1 share = all assets net value / # shares ). The Squad members can start different sub-DAOs or specific guilds just like in the “Syndicate” option. The Squad decides how often and how open the future raising events will be.
Each investment or raising cycle is treated as a separated entity. New members don’t have exposure to the old investments. The investments or raising cycles can be separated into sub-DAOs or guilds or alternatively tokens representing the past investments are minted based on on-chain snapshot taken at the time of the investment.
Exposure to the past investments:
Yes. New members are exposed to the old investments.
No, new members aren’t part of the portfolio of the past investments.
Aim of LunarDAO launch raise size (minimum, aim, maximum):
700 ETH, 7000 ETH, 15000 ETH (if hit, the smart contract expires).
As Portfolio
How often LunarDAO runs a raise event:
Proposal 4x the first year. After the initial one, the Squad will decide. An investment must happen before any next raise.
Proposal 4x the first year. Before any next raising event a new separated guild/sub-DAO is opened for the new members who will manage funds separately from the others.
How often the LunarDAO opens for new Squad members:
Every raising event.
As Portfolio
Condition to join LunarDAO Squad at launch:
Permissionless with a minimum tribute.
As Portfolio
Condition to join LunarDAO Squad in the future:
The initial Squad will decide whether to keep the permissionless setup, introduce invites, raise the minimum tribute bar, limit the max Squad members size etc.
Every new guild or sub-DAO is permissionless, the Squad decides how often to run raising events and open new guild/ sub-DAO.
Minimum tribute on launch / future raise events:
1 ETH on launch/ further raises to be decided.
As Portfolio
On-boarding contract design:
Contract is opened for a limited period and mints new Shares equal to new Squad member tribute. It expires after maximum raise is met or based on pre-defined period. Every Share for every Squad member has an equal entry price.
As Portfolio
On-boarding contract expiry period (1st one/ any next one):
2 weeks the first raise/ 1 week any other one.
2 weeks the initial/ the future ones to be decided.
0.5% once per quarter or alternatively 0.5% every investment execution.
As Portfolio
Shares price bonding curve:
+ 10% each next funding cycle.
As the shares don’t represent the past investments, only the net value of the new treasury, no bonding curve.
Table 2: Tokenomics - Portfolio & Syndicate
TOKENOMICS
Portfolio/ investment club
Syndicate
$VOX (shares) token:
$VOX is LunarDAO governance token. A symbol representing Shares (1 $VOX = 1 Share). An account bound, non-transferable token.
$VOX is LunarDAO governace token. A symbol representing Shares (1 $VOX = 1 Share). An account bound non-transferable token. In the syndicate case an index for easier navigation needs to be introduced as every guild/ sub-DAO shares represent different value.
$VOX price:
At launch the price is 1 ETH (+ management fee) = 100 $VOX.
As Portfolio
$VOX value calculation:
1 $VOX = LunarDAO net value / # of $VOX (shares).
As Portfolio
Loot:
Loot = owners $VOX value in the time of RageQuit. Including owners access to the future allocations if the member was part of the Squad during the investment.
As Portfolio
$LUNAR token:
No. Start without a community token and introduce it later.
As Portfolio
Table 3: Governance - Portfolio & Syndicate
GOVERNANCE
Portfolio/ investment club
Syndicate
Squad membership:
Everyone owning at least 1 $VOX is a Squad member. Squad members have voting power.
Everyone owning at least 1 $VOX is a Squad member, however members can vote on treasury decisions only in the guilds/ sub-DAOs in which their $VOX (shares) are allocated.
Becoming a Squad member
During the raising events only.
As Portfolio
RageQuit:
Yes, any time. No fee, re-entry only during the future raising events.
As Portfolio
GuildKicks (forced RageQuit proposals):
Yes, any Squad member can propose others to be kicked out. In case of YES vote, the $VOX (shares) of such member are transferred to Loot.
As Portfolio
Minimum retention:
25% - if 75% RageQuit during the grace period, the proposal is cancelled.
As Portfolio
Proposals:
5 proposals per day/35 per week can be submitted. A proposal deposit of 0.2ETH is required for submission. Voting process according to LIP, voting open for 72h. Stewards call processProposal function.
As Portfolio
Shaman:
Permission 3: pause, mint, burn shares and loot without DAO proposal. Governor permission not advicable as changes based on LIP.
As Portfolio
Gnosis safe with multisig:
The DAO will be summoned from Gnosis safe. Sentinels (multisig) will remain in their responsibility. On-chain execution in roadmap.
As Portfolio
Both of these approaches are explained with more detailed context and with examples in the repository:
However there are many important details to decide upon, giving all the pros and cons, the main discussion is in between the presented fund management options (or their timing):
1.A) Shall LunarDAO launch on a variation of the PORTFOLIO approach and eventually open guilds or sub-DAOS based on future voting?
or:
1.B) Shall LunarDAO launch as a SYNDICATE?
Other Attributes to Decide
Keep in mind that if we were to choose Moloch V3 model, the questions are related for the setup on launch with a possibility to change many of these settings later on. Those changes, or at least a discussion about them can be included in the roadmap, so different options in different phases of the DAO life cycle are already considered.
What amount does the DAO aim to raise (the first round)? - the proposed mark is 7000 ETH (700 minimum and 15000 cap).
Is the minimum tribute of 1 ETH too large/small?
In the case of Portfolio; is 10% bonding curve too (dis-)advantageous for the old or new members?
In the case of Syndicate design; would people prefer separated sub-DAOs or a common pool with proxy tokens?
Do we want to use Arbitrum or Polygon as a layer 2 solution or stay on Ethereum Mainnet? The latter has higher liquidity and gas fees. Those can be seen as an obstacle when managing many different tokens or a feature preventing from spam. Importantly, some of the supported projects may have bridged tokens only to the Mainnet.
Is management/admin fee of 0.5% acceptable for the community?
a) On entry & every three months.
b) On entry & with every deal execution.
Min tribute should be 0.1ETH to make it inclusive. Think about it. There could be 1000 people interested but without 1ETH. But 1000 x 0.1ETH = 100ETH.
What will the admin fee be used for?
Why 666 ETH? I’m not a fan of the devil messaging for lunarpunk. I think this type of branding goes better with MolochDAO. We have our own identity.
Let’s do 700 ETH, 7000 ETH and 15000ETH.
All raises should be 2 weeks imo as people will always be discovering us. Why change it to 1 week after the first?
I think it should be 0.5% every investment execution and only 0.5% after 3 months if no investment execution within that period.
What insures that guildkicking is not abused? And can it be abused?
Can the 0.2 ETH proposal deposit be confiscated?
Can someone explain the Shaman thing? Don’t understand it.
When it comes to what network we use, is this a question of where do we launch our tokens?
Because for example, treasury management in terms of earning yield is usually a multi-chain endevour. If the question is for launching the token, serious consideration should be made for Arbitrum as they just surpassed Ethereum in number of txs in a day and projects on there are receiving a lot of attention atm.
For what actions can the squad expect to pay gas fees? This will help make the network decision.
I tend to disagree, there were proposals going anywhere between 5-10ETH as a entry floor, and we already pulled it down to 1ETH. It’s gives it a seriousness and filters FOMO pump-dumpers (a little bit as it’s still low).
Everything explained in here. ll the DAO management, operations, administration, dev, media, community, potentialy reearch. As mentioned anything which the 0.5% could not cover will go through an LIP and be voted upon.
A proposal of one of our ally who gave a large feedback on the v1 design.
We had the discussion and there is also other possibility - that the existing squad will not want to do any raise any time soon. And that’s fine as well. Problem is that during the raise you cannot use the DAO as the value of shares changes. If you open the gates (any next time) for longer most of the ppl will enter in the beginning or end and not much happening 10 days, except the current squat is frozen with their proposals.
The options were either or. But mostly depends what the community and allies will say about this, what gives sense. Both are possible.
The major problem is that the projects we are looking into may not launch even bridged tokens on Arbitrub, we need to make more research. I would be up for Arbitrum as well.
I very strongly disagree with 1 ETH min. Constitution DAO did one of the most successful raises ever and there was not a 1 ETH min. It was strength in numbers and they raised 10k+ ETH. Is initial LunarDAO participation only for the rich? I think that is a question to ask.
Sounds good
Appreciate the Ally helping but I don’t think its a good look for us and the movement as a whole. Unless its supposed to be a nod to MolochDAO. At which point I still disagree w/ using that number.
I agree with the consecutive raises. I just don’t know if a week is enough. I feel we can gauge better after the first raise. And this can be changed easily I think if we feel so. I’m basically indifferent as of now.
Ok, I’m going with my suggestion as in principle, there is always a third option whenever something appears binary that could be better than the original 2.
Abused in terms of randomly proposing to kick people and then having to vote and then the person who proposed it could maybe garner enough votes to troll kick or something. I don’t quite understand the Guildkick mechanics but it sounds good to have in general.
When someone puts up .2 ETH, what happens to it? Is it a type of bond? Or does only the depositer have access to insert and remove their ETH for a proposal?
Thanks
I don’t understand the problem tbh. We can accept tokens from any network. Every project nowadays is multichain. From what I understand, the discussion about our network is for our own token right?
If we want as many participants as possible then Arb makes most sense. Next bull run, eth network fees could be crazier than the last. Which means many will be priced out of buying our tokens to participate.
I see your point @dcat and want this to be inclusive as well. Unlike constitution DAO we are not fundraising to a single event, but is building an investment portfolio, the life span of the dao is not finished with the Genesis event. I’m still thinking about this though and see value in your approach.
I don’t have a strong opinion between 666 ETH and 700 ETH as a starting point.
I agree with one week to keep the DAO operational and also because I believe a week will be enough for people to join.
No it is a deposit to prevent spam proposals. It will be returned after the voting is concluded.
I find Arbitrum an exciting possibility, though want to makes sure we are aware of the possibilities as well as limitations before going for this option.
I’ve been checking the developments w/o making any comments before just to see w/ the community is like.
It’s really discouraging to see that not that many have raised the fact that moloch is satanic.
666 as a target, it’s really like targeting to hit the evil number.
The founders of moloch dao are very conscious of this but they don’t give a fuck. They think being satanic is cool and to play with evil themes also makes them edgy.
This is far from reality.
There is no Moloch dao that has done a successful job in attracting people outside of their circle jerk.
The first moloch dao was successful in the raise bringing Vitalik and joe Lubin cuz the summoner was before part of Consensys and has been creating a lot of controversial projects. Even with this success of bringing these founders only one dao that has been successful with this framework came to mind which was more focused in investing (mcv). The rest of those daos are the same people over and over and over trying to create a narrative around ragequit.
Already a lot of people are scared of all the narrative around being anonymous are you for real going to add more friction by deciding to be satanic???
Fuck this bs, fuck evil, fuck satan, fuck those who think is ok to use other people specially women as objects with the theater of letting them be free, fuck all the patriarchal mentality.
If you really care about the mission you should stop immediately any association with those people.
I will reiterate. The 666 came as a proposal of one of the allies who btw had nothing to do with Moloch and that does not mean an aim to be satanic really. It’s not a problem to change a number as that’s just a variable.
That’s why we share it here - public. Preferably if people don’t like something, it’s good to voice it right away instead of wait if others will and than become angry that they didn’t.
We have tabled months of work and started from 0 based on community feedback, that shall be a solid incentive to raise concerns in time.
Further more to think that bcs someone propose a number anyone in this DAO promotes satanism and because of that come to a conclusion that anyone from the team thinks is OK to use other people/women as objects or wants to promote patriarchal mentality… is a little bit far fetched. I am sorry but that’s completely missing the point of who we are and what we do.
Moloch or Baal or w/e they call the new framework says all aver the place satan.
I didn’t voice it right away when I saw it because I hoped that is common sense to not associate this cause w the devil.
My opinion wasn’t related to the core team thinking is ok to be involved w/ satanism or patriarchy, but some of the people mentioned in this post are definitely involved in patriarchal behavior and w/ satanic imagery.
Yes this was my point in my original comment. Let’s stay away from the satanic/devil stuff. 666 sends a bad message and we are not MolochDAO nor do we share the same mission fundamentally. I am also not familiar with their philosophy.
We saw things we could use from their governance design which is what we want to finalize now. We looked at a lot of different DAO designs and we came up with what you see now.
Let’s change the numbers as proposed by @dcat unles anone is against. If the community finds this problematic, this was never anything essential really and that itself had nothing to do w Moloch or any off the people there and no hints to some underlying message.
We use Moloch primitive (read code). And that’s because the v3 aligns the best with the investment DAO while allowing for a completely permissionless entry, an attribute we have promoted since the beginning.
As for philosophy, we have a very clear narrative described in the manifesto.
The more I think about this the more I realize that raising on Arbitrum makes more sense along with a lower min ETH requirement of 0.1ETH.
Arbitrum has a great community which comes with increased network effects, is incredibly fast, affordable and is widely accessible. Both whales and regular users are on there and number of txs has matched ethereum.
After going back and forth, a syndicate seems much simpler, but I think the real benefit of the investment DAO is launching as a portfolio and new participants getting exposure to previous investments. I don’t know if its mentioned but how will the new member joining process look like in this event?
1a. Will new members only be able to join during each new funding cycle?
1b. Will a 10% increase in contribution fee (1 ETH for original entrant, would be 1.1 ETH for next round of new entrants) be enough to offset the original members’ dilution?
1c. If original entrants ragequit as new members are joining, are their shares turned into Loot? If so, what happens to their investments?
1d. As tokens become liquid, Should new joining members get access to this pool of liquid assets or is it only the illiquid tokens (that aren’t live or tradeable yet)? If the investments are now liquid and claimable, does that then take those investments out of the portfolio going forward?
I agree with the new proposal @dcat first mentioned and @lunarpunk69 also addressed and it doesn’t bring the baggage of 700, 7000, 15000 ETH
I believe 1 ETH is good. I think arbitrum could be an option for future raises as most of the capital still sits on L1.
Managing the sub-daos and if proxy-tokens are created to represent investments, it’ll make sense to take place on an L2. I think going with 1 ETH is much more inclusive than every other large investment dao out there. And also we can always alter the floor going forward as well if we see that many people are still left out.
See the responses for 1b. 1c. and 1d. above.
5a. Separated sub-DAOs seem much simpler for accounting. We should consider looking into an L2 for this.
5b. Would gas fees for the sub-dao’s be covered by the sub-daos themselves or the LunarDAO treasury?
5b -2. We also need to consider who is covering gas fees to claim tokens. I think all users should cover their own gas fees including when theyre claiming tokens, unless LunarDAO is refunding ETH due to not raising enough.
I would suggest using the L2 that has the most dev activity, tools, liquidity, ease of use, and security. If either Arbitrum or Polygon outranks the other in these categories, I’d suggest that L2.
I would support 7b On entry and every deal execution over the option for 7a. This avoids people rage quitting before the 3 month period and pushes incentives for research and investments to occur in a timely manner. As long as investments aren’t made to just collect the fee. I’m not saying this would happen but I want mention that this is an outcome of this decision.
There can be a further break down of what the management fees will be applied for:
A sample:
10% server costs
15% media
15% operations
10% administration
10% management
10% dev
15% miscellaneous
15% research
It is difficult to know how much(%) to allocate if you dont know the value of the management fee, but it would be good for fund management to have an idea of what the funds should be allocated towards.
Funding the necessities need be the first costs: Any infrastructural help that keeps LunarDAO fund management going, then breaking down expenses after those costs are covered is the best option IMO.
I addressed my thoughts in a post i just pushed out
Agree with you here 700, 7000, 15000 ETH
@ogma makes a good distinction here, there is time-value lost by locking up an extra week while waiting around. The question may be is 1 extra week of ETH being locked up a big concern?? I like the idea of building FOMO, if you miss out, youll have to be available next time. But I’m also open to altering the entry window length.
I agree with 0.5% on entry and execution of investment
Grief guildkicking is a voting issue that concerns all voting parties. If there is someone getting enough votes and guildkicking people, there will be no way to stop them besides overpowering with the vote. (this is a simplified example)
There’s two things this question addresses. Where to launch for fee consideration, and where to launch for investment consideration.
I see your point and think its a valid consideration. Fees can be a huge issue if the DAO is managing many tokens from investments. This can be a large portion of treasury going directly to fees if staying on an L1. An L2 seems like the best option here
Another thing to consider that @ogma mentions is that not every project/token that LunarDAO may invest in will be compatible even in a multi-chain bridge environment. Representative tokens can be created as erc-20 tokens held by the treasury, and it can be done, but it requires some accounting work to be figured out.
1a. New members joining during investment cycles is good. It is clear when it is possible to join and it is clear for the Squad when to put focus on onboarding new members.
1b. The number is based on recommendations and counting. It is ofc always good to check again to make sure it is a good level.
1d. It was my understanding that if it is the portfolio then all new member get access to the the whole portfolio, liquid or illiquid, but maybe I misunderstood your question @sadar
2. I don’t mind, though I agree with @ogma , and also think that one should be careful with big words and it is helpful to have an approach of inquiry rather than the shared assumptions.
5b -2. I agree that all users should cover their own gas fees.
6. I think staying on Etherum initially is good, keeps it simple instead of adding complexity already at start. When we start to make investments we can evaluate more accurately what is needed, or if gas fees will present a problem.
I also transparency is important. In regards to the management fees - for now we don’t have the full picture for how this will need to be distributed. Therefore, I think if needed a report instead can be submitted periodically to accurately share how the funds are used.
I believe the best scenario here is to launch as portfolio with agreed future raise/onboarding events as a default. If the initial squad does not like it, they can propose a limit of people/ETH to be raised in the next launch to prevent dillution or even decide not to allow for new onboarding. If this would be the will of the squad while the grpowing community would wish to join the squad for the future fundraising events - a new subDAO can be setup so we have a syndicate option and this new subDAO can further on work as nother portfolio or not. This sounds complicated to read, but in fact it’s simple: Raise as a portfolio and let the squad propose and vote on changes.
1a. Yes only during the funding event.
1b. The allies proposed 5-10%, so we went higher of the two.
1c. Loot is a non votable representation of shares. If you ragequit with 2 shares out of 200 total, you have 1% of whatever the treasury is. A good point is on the further dilution of the future investments which are represented as SAFT and still due to be recieved. We have to clarify this. But the option above where the squad can change the governance and decide to open a new subdao instead of further dillution addresses that.
1d. In my opinion everything is a part of the protfolio until you ragequit. The portfolio will be preferably constructed of different privacy tokens.
Good and important details. Let’s note these two down and
Changed
100% both. We shall not compare LunarDAO to non investment DAOs as a reference in this question imo.
5a. I think it can be a point on the roadmap.
5b. For what concretely? Vote, ragequit etc is a users fee.
5b-2. The beauty in this primitive is the RageQuit. LunarDAO does not have to decide to disolv if the minimum is not reached neither to make anyone claiming/redeeming or sending tokens as ppl hit the ragequeit function on their own and pay the gas.
I agree, still would proibably not use it for the launch.
Agree - seems like the most feasible stuff. 0.5% on entry + with a deal done on the execution date (so ppl can ragequit if disagreeing). If you have 3 such events in 3 months, the Squad not ragequiting but benefiting from those events will not be unhappy to pay 0.5% for the work which brings returns. If there is 0 such deals, well we better argument well in an LIP payment proposal how much and why we need such support. Sounds reasonable and fair!
700, 7000, 15000 ETH