Tokenomics: $LUNAR & $VOX

LunarDAO tokenomics is described in the wiki.

:point_right: $LUNAR & $VOX
:point_right: Smart Contracts
:point_right: Distribution
:point_right: $LUNAR supply release
:point_right: Genesis Event
:point_right: $VOX Airdrop
:point_right: Staking
:point_right: Liquidity providing
:point_right: Raise & Project Investment

The contracts are hard-coded and once on-chain, they cannot be reverted, LunarDAO is planning to launch the Genesis Sale in the second half of January. The community input is very important so the changes can be in order to create tokenomics meeting the aims and the mission of the squad with success.

Please share here any feedback, questions or suggestions!

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Let’s discuss:

  1. What are the concerns with LUNAR/ VOX?
  2. What are the potential alternatives?


  • LUNAR/ VOX may not be the best design for the health and longevity of the DAO. Historically, DAOs with a capped supply and high APRs were short term phenomena and did not survive.
  • LUNAR/ VOX distracts from the goal of investing in privacy.
  • LUNAR/VOX should be voted in by the community, not imposed on the DAO by the core team.


Hey @anon
Glad to hear from you. Will address some of your points in a minute.

Good to read your points. Have some questions for clarity and some input. This discussion is vital!

Addressing the concerns:

  • We discussed the point on max supply vs infinite supplly a lot in the team and with the devs and everyone was supportive of limitted supply for the following reasons:
    • The projects printing money infinitely are always dumping massively, unless big LP/farming things like Cruve
    • The supply is still not all released at once, not event within first 10 years. Tried to make a balance between not large % supply jumps and not dropping all supply to Genesis sale buyers to centralize the token bags in few while not making the intial buyers being exposed to steep release curve forever.
  • The release curve is an easy formula and we made a script to play with it, so it can be easily changed
  • How can we define high vs small APR. We are in a believe that $LUNAR does not have a high APR. In fact we did not focus on APR at all, I will have a look on it based on the current numbers. Will count it quickly for first year and lemme know if I made a mistake somewhere. Single staking:
Period days Emission a day *365 days Emission % to staking rewards Single Staking APR
0-30 0.2% 73 50% 36.5%
31-90 0.1% 36.5 50% 18.25%
91-210 0.05% 18.25 50% 9.125%
211-450 0.025% 9.125 50% 4.5625%
  • The highest APR will be the first 30 days at 36.5% and by the 1 year mark we are at 4.5%,


  • What would be the numbers to not be considered high APR?
  • How would the distribution work if the token would be infinite supply based if the above numbers are high? I mean the capped supply goes against high APR and vise versa - so wonder how to get both without making the project hitting 0.
  • How else shall we create a community in an investment DAO if we do not have a token the community is based on? Or any treshold creating the community?
  • How else shall the DAO distribute the emission, especially if infinite to have less staking rewards - wehre will the printed token go to not harm the DAO?
  • Do you see a problem in the Curve model of time staking to show commitment to the DAO → $VOX → Voting power for people who are committed?

Addressing alternatives:

  • We have looked into the rage quit and if there is a strong will, we can addopt it - that’s a part of the governance. We starting on multisig (and reached to trusted channels for people to take on this role so it’s not centralized in the core anon team) for the reasons to be able to LIP+vote on the most fitting governance model post launch with the Squad members. That is 100% changable at any time.
  • Will have a look into PleasrDAO
  • MolochDAO we looked into closely and will check the invetment primitive you mentioning. Is is for the Raise & Investment events or for the initial DAO treasury raise? Just to be clear.

Hey @anon , I appreciate you sharing your concerns and proposals for alternatives. I can share the thought behind not including RageQuit into the governance. They foundation of LunarDAO is build on the idea of squad wealth, which is something deliberate, with a clear aim and strategy. The way to ensure our development in the DAO is through discussions like this, to gain new perspectives and learn from each others experiences and knowledge. RageQuit is not considering the mission, nor does it consider the community. It only considers the individual. If the decisions of the DAO is not aligned with someones perspectives it is possible to sell and leave the DAO at any point.

When reading about MolochDAO’s RageQuit mechanism of course there is an opening to use their approach of ‘Dilution bonds’:

’ For instance, if 80% of the voting power of the guild were to RageQuit all at once, the remaining members would suffer a 5x dilution. When the proposal is being processed, the Dilution Bound would be triggered and the proposal would fail, i.e. no new Shares would be issued.’

Through LIP (LunarDAO Improvement Proposal) it is possible to propose any suggestion which then will be discussed an voted on, including a RageQuit mechanism. We shape the DAO together and in the end, it is up to the community.

I just named 3 highly successful DAOs. PleasrDAO and MetaCartel Ventures have both been great for generating squad wealth. What DAOs can you name that have been successful using a LUNAR/ VOX style model?

Where is the main risk of not success with having capped supply but released over decades? I addressed the “high” APRs in numbers and wonder what you think about the questions.

The VOX model comes from CRV/veCRV primitive. And a believe that community holding onto the governance token shall have say in the governance and investment decisions - they will be the most impacted by gain or loss of the DAO.

The capped supply proposal is based on the experience of post defi summer time in which large amount of DAOs and “DAOs” (any project which says it’s token based governance) went under ice due to their thin air printed token, juicy TVL/APR marketing which users abandoned when they saw the APR cannot meet the inflation rate and left last few believers with bags without any liquidity to sell them into. This nightmarish scenario often repeated especially on small projects made us believe that even with Curve locking mechanism we shall be humble and realistic - as it’s a considerably smaller project than major DeFi protocols and DAOs - and cap the supply to prevent the steep end. These are the intentions.

based on the mentioned ones I think we made a multisig instead of a hardcode governance as this way the community can change the way they want to govern the DAO, and possibly change to the latter.

I’d be interested to hear your thoughts on @ogma questions, if you’d consider that. I think that can make ideas for proposed changes more clear.


Can you elaborate on what you mean by LUNAR/VOX distracts from the goal of investing in privacy?

Do you mean you see it as a unnecessary mechanism or a round-about way to try and invest in privacy projects?

Who are the Core Team members who receive 7% of the supply?

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Hey @polarpunklabs and welcome here.

Core team is composed of Stewards and right now includes media as well.

Here is the entire governance page: Overview.

Below is about the two mention committees:


LunarDAO Stewards (LunarDAO core team) is a committee dedicated to support and guide the essential works of the DAO. Initially, at launch, they include founding members of the DAO. The number of Stewards should not be less than three and no more than ten. The LunarDAO Stewards responsibilities includes, but are not limited to:

  • Coordinate operations
  • Coordinate administration
  • Community management
  • Share information - Making sure all other DAO members are aware of proposals and are notified in time to be able to participate in voting
  • Ensure implementation of community decisions
  • Communication and coordination in regards to project investment

How to become a Steward

To become a Steward any member can submit an application which will be reviewed by the Stewards. They will take into consideration ideas and proposals which can support LunarDAO mission as well as initiatives and activity of the applicant within the community. The Stewards may also make a call out for new Stewards if additional support is needed.


The Media committee is responsible for updating the web page, mdbook and twitter. The media output is in accordance with LunarDAO mission, decisions and development. The media committee can also coordinate and recruit members for media productions based on LunarDAOs mission and goals, participate in interviews or initiate media works that are beneficial to the DAO.

Thanks, but can we get a list of the Steward nyms?

Sure, I believe every steward introduce self in the intro channel already: @sadar @ramla @violett @dcat @zero and myself @ogma.

The 6 of us are responsible for all you can see and read, that includes to find another people who are task oriented supporters. So on the question of the allocation - this also includes people helping as: devs, sys-admins, legal advice, graphic & design, translation etc.

Than there are committees Sentinels and Research, which are not part of Stewards and will be introduced in the coming days.

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Dear lunarpunks,

It’s amazing to witness the lunarpunk meme being adopted by the community and I’m truly excited to see what you will build.

But I’ll be totally honest: I’m not a big fan of LUNAR/ VOX.

My concern is that LUNAR/ VOX relies on fragile price-positive feedback loops. Token-engineering that relies on price as a variable is fragile and can result in death spirals and pump and dump dynamics.

IMO as an investment DAO your primary incentive should be to grow the treasury. I’m concerned LUNAR/VOX is introducing external incentives that do not necessarily align with this goal.

In general, I’m a big fan of taking simple and conservative approaches to token-engineering and copying things that are tried and tested. Moloch V2 which is a for-profit investment DAO primitive might be worth researching.

I’d also be interested to hear from the community about whether my concerns are founded. I think the ideal outcome is that LUNAR/VOX could be voted on by the community just like any other change.

This obviously requires some way to garner community opinion (like a token) so I appreciate it’s not straightforward. I also know you guys have put a lot of time and expense into the LUNAR/VOX token-economics. Just keep in mind the sunk-cost fallacy and make sure that’s not dictating any of your decisions.

Thank you for your work, and fierce fight <3


First of all - WELCOME :wave: :wave: :wave:

Thank you very much for your input. I won’t answer directly as I have taken a lot of space and am by large part behind the original tokenomics, instead, will bring this to tonights meeting in IRC.

We were having a lot of positive feedback and believe that this is a good way to go and with that were planning to launch genesis event within days. I will propose to halt and discuss more.

It’s not a matter of anyones ego, if we can find a better way to meet the mission, we shall apply changes. It is true that the costs, work and energy is quite high at this point so will have to navigate around these real questions as well.

Will get back here soon.


Wanted to share some notes from a discussion I had with friend regarding the tokenomics. It’s a person who’s opinion I value highly and who has years of experience in the crypto space. I’m just typing up what they said without editorializing at all.

First off, they said they are a huge supporter of the vision and salute all of you for putting your energy into this. It’s from this place of love that the following critique comes from. It’s intended to strengthen the DAO and make it more viable and robust.


  • LUNAR/VOX incentivizes people to hold LUNAR and hoard wealth.
  • Deflationary dynamics reward newcomers at the expense of late adopters.
  • LUNAR/VOX over-values early participation at the expense of long-term vision.
  • There is currently no incentive to grow the treasury or invest in projects.
  • Typically with investment funds, there is a direct incentive to pursue new investments.
  • With LunarDAO’s current tokenecon, there is no incentive to pursue investments beyond the initial raise. Early founders can just hold LUNAR and grow wealth that way.
  • This is essentially engineering a monopoly. If done properly, token-engineering can break monopolies, rather than create them.
  • LunarDAO needs to generate real value beyond just issuing tokens.


  • Look at how normal investment funds are structured.
  • Moloch is probably the best example of a investment DAO primitive.
  • There are several web3 accelerators currently being developed. Check out Accelerator - LongHash Ventures,
  • Perhaps LunarDAO could implement a management fee to reward DAO stewards.
  • LunarDAO should also research ways to get beyond token-weighted voting, such as quadratic voting or rate-limited voting.
  • Read more Benjamin Tucker and less Adam Smith.

That’s was the TLDR of the conversation. I think it raises some very important points. My main point of disagreement is with quadratic voting though which is currently impossible to do in an anonymous way.

If you guys agree that this needs more research, one option would be to setup a multisig for donations until a more robust incentive structure for investment DAOs has been figured out.

Hope this is helpful


This is extremely valuable both from you and from the friend who share this with you based on trust.

We have agreed to halt the Genesis Event (Lunar sale/ VOX airdrop) planned for the coming weekend and take more input. Not as a step back but to exactly make a robust design.

I have more points from similar sources and will share them today. Will only comment after that input to allow space for other voices first.

Thank you @lunar-mining


Honestly, the mechanism feels overly complex and a somewhat difficult to reason about.

Personally, I’d be much more inclined to go for a Nouns-style emission schedule, perhaps combined with Moloch-style rage-quit, rather than relying on liquidity incentives and locking.

The only potential drawback I see with this is that it implies a slower ramp-up, but this could also be seen as a positive.

Also worth noting that $VOX is described as non-transferable, but this is near impossible to enforce. It would be trivial to write a wrapper contract for it, or simply to mint it from a contract wallet that could swap owners (like a safe).

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