Do we also include this in the governance? (if Molochv3 is an accepted proposal):
"Proposal Deposit: Used to protect against member spam. Deposited by user when sponsoring a proposal. Returned to their internal balance (minus processing reward if applicable) after the proposal is processed.
Proposal Reward: Used to reward members who process proposals. Originally meant to reimburse those spending gas to process proposals, so not as necessary on networks like xDAI and Polygon."
Ragequit is easy. the member can choose how many Shares to ragequit.
Add new member:
In Daohaus to become a member the proposal need to be sponsored by an existing member (vouch) and then everyone need to vote on the proposal.
This is aligning both with the proposal of a vouch system as well as minimum tribute.
To start, this choice wasn’t easy. We realized that working under pseudonyms means people don’t recognize you, and therefore you start with zero reputation. It doesn’t matter whether you’re big and respected in your field - nobody knows that it’s you. This condition deprives you of the credibility you may have previously built, and puts you in the position of redoing everything all over again. It is basically a fresh start full of challenges.
There is no reputation to work off without identifying markers
It doesn’t directly address the potential of collusion, but the 5 public sentinel members with their reputation, should alleviate potential concern, but still relies on a base layer of trust
There is the possibility of moving away 100% and managing it all on-chain
Our multisignatures are from multiple continents and jurisdictions. This decision is taken to ensure initial trust based on several well known pseudonyms in the space who remain decentralized. An issue we had to address on the launch is to prevent a possibility of large actors (ie FED) to buy a mojority of $LUNAR and attack the treasury. We are happy to find and deploy proposals of a full on-chain implementation post-launch if this thread can be addressed well.
I am more or less just registering that the presence of three anon team members means we can never be sure the project won’t be rugged. This is just the brute realpolitik.
We can’t really be sure it’s even three people or just one person or one or more of the sentinels, etc. It is even possible the 5 sentinels were chosen precisely because they have good reps paper over the three anon issue.
Do I believe this is the case, very unlikely in a lunarpunk activist context, but since it has not raised any more worries I would just consider my point here a minor view.
I think multisig is better than on-chain. Better to have a social layer.
Your points are valid ofc. I will try to let some fulmoon light into this:
There have been people with a solid reputation who on TW and particularly in chats (some of which the community here - early Squad/allies may be part of) shared that they - however not part of LunarDAO - vouch for the core-team.
The call out for sentinels was also opened in some chats with solid number of allies and minds alike with the aims of this DAO.
If the different inputs of @dcat , @zero, @sadar, @violett, @ramla and me (including the language expression) and the the work behind the entire DAO comes out as being done by one person (+ the speed this person would need to switch nicks during community meetings etc) - we shall reflect what did we do wrong that 6 stewards job (+ 7 occasional externals) comes out as a one person job.
If you @polarpunklabs are the pseudonymous who I think and you would be willing to address this concern by taking a Sentinel role instead of one Steward on the list, I would welcome the proposal and will bring it to Monday community meeting. Believe such proposal would be found positive.
I know all 4. points are social - trust based, but that’s the role of the multi-sig. We can scale the Steward presence down to 1 or remove the trust layer completely.
Table 1: Fundamental approaches: Portfolio & Syndicate
FUND MANAGEMENT – Design Essentials
Portfolio/ investment club
All the assets in the treasury are pooled together as a common portfolio. Each share despite the time of purchase represents the same value (1 share = all assets net value / # shares ). The Squad members can start different sub-DAOs or specific guilds just like in the “Syndicate” option. The Squad decides how often and how open the future raising events will be.
Each investment or raising cycle is treated as a separated entity. New members don’t have exposure to the old investments. The investments or raising cycles can be separated into sub-DAOs or guilds or alternatively tokens representing the past investments are minted based on on-chain snapshot taken at the time of the investment.
Exposure to the past investments:
Yes. New members are exposed to the old investments.
No, new members aren’t part of the portfolio of the past investments.
Aim of LunarDAO launch raise size (minimum, aim, maximum):
700 ETH, 7000 ETH, 15000 ETH (if hit, the smart contract expires).
How often LunarDAO runs a raise event:
Proposal 4x the first year. After the initial one, the Squad will decide. An investment must happen before any next raise.
Proposal 4x the first year. Before any next raising event a new separated guild/sub-DAO is opened for the new members who will manage funds separately from the others.
How often the LunarDAO opens for new Squad members:
Every raising event.
Condition to join LunarDAO Squad at launch:
Permissionless with a minimum tribute.
Condition to join LunarDAO Squad in the future:
The initial Squad will decide whether to keep the permissionless setup, introduce invites, raise the minimum tribute bar, limit the max Squad members size etc.
Every new guild or sub-DAO is permissionless, the Squad decides how often to run raising events and open new guild/ sub-DAO.
Minimum tribute on launch / future raise events:
1 ETH on launch/ further raises to be decided.
On-boarding contract design:
Contract is opened for a limited period and mints new Shares equal to new Squad member tribute. It expires after maximum raise is met or based on pre-defined period. Every Share for every Squad member has an equal entry price.
On-boarding contract expiry period (1st one/ any next one):
2 weeks the first raise/ 1 week any other one.
2 weeks the initial/ the future ones to be decided.
0.5% once per quarter or alternatively 0.5% every investment execution.
Shares price bonding curve:
+ 10% each next funding cycle.
As the shares don’t represent the past investments, only the net value of the new treasury, no bonding curve.
Table 2: Tokenomics - Portfolio & Syndicate
Portfolio/ investment club
$VOX (shares) token:
$VOX is LunarDAO governance token. A symbol representing Shares (1 $VOX = 1 Share). An account bound, non-transferable token.
$VOX is LunarDAO governace token. A symbol representing Shares (1 $VOX = 1 Share). An account bound non-transferable token. In the syndicate case an index for easier navigation needs to be introduced as every guild/ sub-DAO shares represent different value.
At launch the price is 1 ETH (+ management fee) = 100 $VOX.
$VOX value calculation:
1 $VOX = LunarDAO net value / # of $VOX (shares).
Loot = owners $VOX value in the time of RageQuit. Including owners access to the future allocations if the member was part of the Squad during the investment.
No. Start without a community token and introduce it later.
Table 3: Governance - Portfolio & Syndicate
Portfolio/ investment club
Everyone owning at least 1 $VOX is a Squad member. Squad members have voting power.
Everyone owning at least 1 $VOX is a Squad member, however members can vote on treasury decisions only in the guilds/ sub-DAOs in which their $VOX (shares) are allocated.
Becoming a Squad member
During the raising events only.
Yes, any time. No fee, re-entry only during the future raising events.
GuildKicks (forced RageQuit proposals):
Yes, any Squad member can propose others to be kicked out. In case of YES vote, the $VOX (shares) of such member are transferred to Loot.
25% - if 75% RageQuit during the grace period, the proposal is cancelled.
5 proposals per day/35 per week can be submitted. A proposal deposit of 0.2ETH is required for submission. Voting process according to LIP, voting open for 72h. Stewards call processProposal function.
Permission 3: pause, mint, burn shares and loot without DAO proposal. Governor permission not advicable as changes based on LIP.
Gnosis safe with multisig:
The DAO will be summoned from Gnosis safe. Sentinels (multisig) will remain in their responsibility. On-chain execution in roadmap.
Both of these approaches are explained with more detailed context and with examples in the repository:
However there are many important details to decide upon, giving all the pros and cons, the main discussion is in between the presented fund management options (or their timing):
1.A) Shall LunarDAO launch on a variation of the PORTFOLIO approach and eventually open guilds or sub-DAOS based on future voting?
1.B) Shall LunarDAO launch as a SYNDICATE?
Other Attributes to Decide
Keep in mind that if we were to choose Moloch V3 model, the questions are related for the setup on launch with a possibility to change many of these settings later on. Those changes, or at least a discussion about them can be included in the roadmap, so different options in different phases of the DAO life cycle are already considered.
What amount does the DAO aim to raise (the first round)? - the proposed mark is 7000 ETH (700 minimum and 15000 cap).
Is the minimum tribute of 1 ETH too large/small?
In the case of Portfolio; is 10% bonding curve too (dis-)advantageous for the old or new members?
In the case of Syndicate design; would people prefer separated sub-DAOs or a common pool with proxy tokens?
Do we want to use Arbitrum or Polygon as a layer 2 solution or stay on Ethereum Mainnet? The latter has higher liquidity and gas fees. Those can be seen as an obstacle when managing many different tokens or a feature preventing from spam. Importantly, some of the supported projects may have bridged tokens only to the Mainnet.
Is management/admin fee of 0.5% acceptable for the community?
a) On entry & every three months.
b) On entry & with every deal execution.
Min tribute should be 0.1ETH to make it inclusive. Think about it. There could be 1000 people interested but without 1ETH. But 1000 x 0.1ETH = 100ETH.
What will the admin fee be used for?
Why 666 ETH? I’m not a fan of the devil messaging for lunarpunk. I think this type of branding goes better with MolochDAO. We have our own identity.
Let’s do 700 ETH, 7000 ETH and 15000ETH.
All raises should be 2 weeks imo as people will always be discovering us. Why change it to 1 week after the first?
I think it should be 0.5% every investment execution and only 0.5% after 3 months if no investment execution within that period.
What insures that guildkicking is not abused? And can it be abused?
Can the 0.2 ETH proposal deposit be confiscated?
Can someone explain the Shaman thing? Don’t understand it.
When it comes to what network we use, is this a question of where do we launch our tokens?
Because for example, treasury management in terms of earning yield is usually a multi-chain endevour. If the question is for launching the token, serious consideration should be made for Arbitrum as they just surpassed Ethereum in number of txs in a day and projects on there are receiving a lot of attention atm.
For what actions can the squad expect to pay gas fees? This will help make the network decision.
I tend to disagree, there were proposals going anywhere between 5-10ETH as a entry floor, and we already pulled it down to 1ETH. It’s gives it a seriousness and filters FOMO pump-dumpers (a little bit as it’s still low).
Everything explained in here. ll the DAO management, operations, administration, dev, media, community, potentialy reearch. As mentioned anything which the 0.5% could not cover will go through an LIP and be voted upon.
A proposal of one of our ally who gave a large feedback on the v1 design.
We had the discussion and there is also other possibility - that the existing squad will not want to do any raise any time soon. And that’s fine as well. Problem is that during the raise you cannot use the DAO as the value of shares changes. If you open the gates (any next time) for longer most of the ppl will enter in the beginning or end and not much happening 10 days, except the current squat is frozen with their proposals.
The options were either or. But mostly depends what the community and allies will say about this, what gives sense. Both are possible.
I very strongly disagree with 1 ETH min. Constitution DAO did one of the most successful raises ever and there was not a 1 ETH min. It was strength in numbers and they raised 10k+ ETH. Is initial LunarDAO participation only for the rich? I think that is a question to ask.
Appreciate the Ally helping but I don’t think its a good look for us and the movement as a whole. Unless its supposed to be a nod to MolochDAO. At which point I still disagree w/ using that number.
I agree with the consecutive raises. I just don’t know if a week is enough. I feel we can gauge better after the first raise. And this can be changed easily I think if we feel so. I’m basically indifferent as of now.
Ok, I’m going with my suggestion as in principle, there is always a third option whenever something appears binary that could be better than the original 2.
Abused in terms of randomly proposing to kick people and then having to vote and then the person who proposed it could maybe garner enough votes to troll kick or something. I don’t quite understand the Guildkick mechanics but it sounds good to have in general.
When someone puts up .2 ETH, what happens to it? Is it a type of bond? Or does only the depositer have access to insert and remove their ETH for a proposal?
I don’t understand the problem tbh. We can accept tokens from any network. Every project nowadays is multichain. From what I understand, the discussion about our network is for our own token right?
If we want as many participants as possible then Arb makes most sense. Next bull run, eth network fees could be crazier than the last. Which means many will be priced out of buying our tokens to participate.
I see your point @dcat and want this to be inclusive as well. Unlike constitution DAO we are not fundraising to a single event, but is building an investment portfolio, the life span of the dao is not finished with the Genesis event. I’m still thinking about this though and see value in your approach.
I don’t have a strong opinion between 666 ETH and 700 ETH as a starting point.
I agree with one week to keep the DAO operational and also because I believe a week will be enough for people to join.
No it is a deposit to prevent spam proposals. It will be returned after the voting is concluded.
I find Arbitrum an exciting possibility, though want to makes sure we are aware of the possibilities as well as limitations before going for this option.
I’ve been checking the developments w/o making any comments before just to see w/ the community is like.
It’s really discouraging to see that not that many have raised the fact that moloch is satanic.
666 as a target, it’s really like targeting to hit the evil number.
The founders of moloch dao are very conscious of this but they don’t give a fuck. They think being satanic is cool and to play with evil themes also makes them edgy.
This is far from reality.
There is no Moloch dao that has done a successful job in attracting people outside of their circle jerk.
The first moloch dao was successful in the raise bringing Vitalik and joe Lubin cuz the summoner was before part of Consensys and has been creating a lot of controversial projects. Even with this success of bringing these founders only one dao that has been successful with this framework came to mind which was more focused in investing (mcv). The rest of those daos are the same people over and over and over trying to create a narrative around ragequit.
Already a lot of people are scared of all the narrative around being anonymous are you for real going to add more friction by deciding to be satanic???
Fuck this bs, fuck evil, fuck satan, fuck those who think is ok to use other people specially women as objects with the theater of letting them be free, fuck all the patriarchal mentality.
If you really care about the mission you should stop immediately any association with those people.
I will reiterate. The 666 came as a proposal of one of the allies who btw had nothing to do with Moloch and that does not mean an aim to be satanic really. It’s not a problem to change a number as that’s just a variable.
That’s why we share it here - public. Preferably if people don’t like something, it’s good to voice it right away instead of wait if others will and than become angry that they didn’t.
We have tabled months of work and started from 0 based on community feedback, that shall be a solid incentive to raise concerns in time.
Further more to think that bcs someone propose a number anyone in this DAO promotes satanism and because of that come to a conclusion that anyone from the team thinks is OK to use other people/women as objects or wants to promote patriarchal mentality… is a little bit far fetched. I am sorry but that’s completely missing the point of who we are and what we do.