Future steps for LunarDAO - the next proposals

There is no roadmap for LunarDAO, only new projects that come into the DAO’s view that we think important to help fund.

We are looking to the future of LunarDAO, the mission remains the same, we have flexibility to do what we want with the DAO, so here are a few things discussed recently that I think would be exciting and also help us as we grow and find more projects.

  • Portfolio style:

This concept was discussed originally when LunarDAO was created (GitHub - lunardao/dao: LunarDAO Architecture)

This would be like other similar investment DAOs, instead of LunarDAO raising separately for EVERY project, we raise a pool, and then allocate to projects as they arise.

This should make it easier for us to deploy funds as we discover projects. We wouldnt need to make separate DAOs for each new investment (which includes the phase on getting the word out, an onboarding phase, etc)

  • Sustainability:

This would allow us to allocate a portion of the funds toward sustainability of LunarDAO

A % of the funds raised can be earmarked for fund maintenance/management

  • DAO membership

This seemed like the most complex issue to me. How do we allow new members into the DAO? Do we allow ever one entry at the same price? or an escalating entry point? Should we have open enrollment in perpetuity?

What about previous investments? For example, if I join the portfolio DAO after they’ve made 3 investments already, do I get access to these 3 tokens, or do I only get access to tokens going forward after Ive joined the portfolio style DAO?

Some other investment DAOs like CultDAO and Mantle(formerly BitDAO) have investments paid directly in their own token

We still want this to remain open to the public and allow any size of entrant to join. Also, as long as people understand the tradeoffs before entering and we are explicit, I think this is something we should consider, at the least

I bring this as a topic to discuss with the community and get some critiques, and if this seems like a good idea, Id like to keep pushing forward

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On LunarDAO github, in governance the difference between portfolio and syndicate style dao.

Portfolio:
"By default all the assets are pooled in the DAO main treasury. The new members joining are part of the same portfolio and exposed to the past investments. "

Syndicate:
"Each fundraising cycle (possibly each investment) is treated as a separated entity, unique sub-DAO/guild. Members joining in future fundraising events share a new treasury (sub-DAO or a guild) without an access to the investments from the past. "

The advantages with portfolio is continuity and sustainability pooling funds together to be able to continuously invest i project and also sustain the infrastructure, development and administration needed to make these investments possible.

The disadvantage with portfolio is as the quote is pointing to, new members are exposed to past investments and those who are already members get their shared diluted.

The advantage with syndicate is as the quote is formulated and the disadvantage the situation we are in now. We raised funds for DarkFi and it was successful. We sent the funds and received an NFT. We don’t have any resources to fund other projects as this was focused on this donation only. For longevity the portfolio style dao provides opportunities and sustainability which I believe we need.

We talked in t he past about the need for a mix and I wonder if it would make sense to have a portfolio style as an ongoing project and create the syndicated when portfolio is no fulfilling what we want to do in a specific situation. I think this is also how we talked about it previously.

If we would agree on this, does it make sense to have it on Arbitrum, wait for DarkFi to use anondao primitive or something else?

thanks for the input @zero

To answer your question, I would say we can attempt this portfolio style now (when we decide on the path forward, ofc), and when a better solution is live, we can migrate to that solution (Not sure how easy that would be, but I think better to keep pushing forward, than wait and see for an anon dao (as you referenced))

What do we think of arbitrum versus Eth L1? Im good with either, it wasnt an issue with me using Eth base layer or moving to arbitrum, but it seems like there are less private solutions built into arbitrum. Did LDII being on arbitrum make it difficult for users to participate? We were successful in the raise and were public enough about the process. I think with enough documentation we can handle either approach.

Im good with either option, but would want to hear others opinions on that.

I also like the idea of portfolio because we havent yet tried it. If its an abject failure, we have the flexibility to sunset and try a different approach.

I like that it will be able to move much quicker, will move as quick as we can due diligence teams and open a proposal. We also can have a sidepocket to manage expenses, which also allows us to keep chugging along without services dropping.

I ALSO like investing directly in the projects token as opposed to getting compensated in a DAO token (Cult and Mantle compensate directly in a DAO token). This issue (how old members are diluted and new members enter) seems to be the largest issue that we want to address. This is why LunarDAO went syndicate route previously.

While still researching the portfolio option, Ive been working on what I think is the best path forward in regards to LunarDAO doing a portfolio style DAO. Ive been looking at Cult and metacartel tokenomics. I’ve gathered a synopsis of both DAO tokenomics and governance. Ill give my thoughts on what seems to make the most sense to me following their summaries.

Both Cult and Metacartel are Portfolio DAOs. Metacartel seems to be less active as of recently. Metacartel is permissioned (you make a proposal to enter) Previously we’ve used Moloch V3, and Metacartel uses an earlier version of the Moloch contracts (v2). Cult is a permissionless DAO, anyone can participate as long as they own $CULT.

MetaCartel Ventures (MCV) Overview:

  • Mages - are DAO members that are participating in management efforts, researching, sourcing investment opportunities, deal due diligence and conducting asset management. They can vote & submit proposals and RageQuit.

  • Goblins - DAO members that hold a passive role, they can participate but nothing is expected from them. They also can vote & submit proposals and RageQuit.

  • Summoners - operational members responsible for services around legal, financial and coordination related tasks, supervised by Mages. Summoners don’t need to be members. Summoners work for fees negotiated by founding DAO member

  • permissioned membership, and continuing membership is permissioned and community-policed

  • membership shares are non-transferable

  • Built on Moloch V2, so RageQuit exists as a function and RQ is permissionless

  • An exiting member of MCV receives tokens representing its entire pro rata interest in each of the DAOs individual assets at the time of exit.

  • RQ members receive a mix of two assets RageTokens (Freely trading payment tokens like ETH, DAI, etc.) and RageClaims (non-transferrable, tokens that represent the exiting DAO member’s remaining economic pro rata claim to the DAO’s future income from the revenue-generating assets the DAO holds at the time of the member’s exit.

  • Two types of proposals ordinary proposal and extraordinary proposals

  • Ran as a regulated incorporated company, each goblin needd to be an “accredited investor”

  • GuildBank - DAO smart contract that manages the tokens of the DAO.

  • Claims tokens - Claims token smart contracts that allocate claims on the future revenue that is deposited into the claims token contracts via specific ERC-20 tokens

  • Off-chain - off-chain assets used for paying service provider’s held in the DAO’s incorporated bank account

  • 8 different proposal types:

    • membership admission
    • membership expulsion
    • Jailing and Ragekick
    • Bailouts
    • Token whitelist proposals
    • Investment proposals
    • OTC/Trade proposal
    • Grant proposal
  • If there is an investment prior to a token going live, there is a process. Instead of a cryptonative token, a specified ERC-20 token corresponding with an instance of that investment’s claims token contract is accepted by the GuildBank.

    • A Mage (or summoner(s) acting on behalf of one or more Mages) proposing the investment,
      will deploy an instance of ClaimsToken.sol

    • Next, the corresponding claims token contract ERC-20 is whitelisted as via the proposal

    • After that, an investment proposal is made in exchange for the Claims Tokens as tribute in
      exchange for DAO membership shares or a specified whitelisted token as payment for the
      investment.

    • If the proposal is approved, the GuildBank will receive the Claims Tokens, and the payment
      would be either distributed to the application or go under custody of a Mage or Summoner
      as any pending legal documents are prepared and executed.

    • there is theoretically an undetermined waiting period between the time of investment and the realisation of the desired liquid tokens (including token lockup conditions). This waiting period could be either be short or quite lengthy, depending on the terms of the investment and/or the ensuing series of events. During this period, DAO members that RageQuit with their RageClaims may redeem such cryptonative tokens once the DAO receive such tokens and are issued through the claims token contract.

Cult Overview:

  • Guardians (top 50 staked token holders) are the only ones who can make proposals (but they cannot vote)
  • The Many is everyone else thats holding $CULT. The MANY can vote on proposals
  • Each project investment is a set total of 15.5 ETH’s (paid in CULT) of which 13 ETH (paid in CULT) actually goes to the investment. 2.5 ETH (paid in CULT) are burned.
  • They burn 2.5 ETH’s worth of CULT as a deflationary mechanism.
  • There are two tokens $CULT and $dCULT. $dCULT is the “proof of stake” token. It’s non transferable. Only the user who staked their cult will benefit from $dCULT. Owning a proportion of $dCULT when profits are sent to the DAO allows you to claim your reward which is paid out in proportion to your $dCULT ownership.
  • In this example, lets use a 12 month vest for 1.2% of the supply of an example project. On the repayment date, the investee project swaps 0.1% of its supply monthly for twelve months (1.2% over 12 months) of $TOKEN_example for $CULT. Investee project then sends half of the $TOKEN_example to a burn wallet, and the other half to the CULTDAO wallet, which is paid out to dCULT holders.
  • You must be staked to vote. You only receive rewards from the investee tokens if you are staked.
  • Aside from all of this, there is a 0.04% trading tax that goes to the CULT treasury
  • Total supply currently ~ 5 trillion $CULT, I believe max circulation was about 6.67 trillion

After seeing both of these options, MCV is most similar to what LunarDAO is already, but there are a few distinctions where I can see value of CULT’s process.

  • MCV’ s permissioned entry limits the amount of people from joining. This application process also puts controls on how to properly allocate shares to new members. We won’t be going the permissioned route, so this doesnt really help us

  • I especially like CULT’s staking mechanism, you only get paid out when you are staking. This seems to address the issue we had concerning late-joining members and these late-joining members getting access to previous raises.

  • Im not against the burning mechanisms of CULT, but this can be discussed

  • The trading fee of 0.04% that routes back to the treasury is a good mechanism to keep funds coming in

  • I particularly like how governance has worked thus far in LD versus this Guardian/The Many setup.

  • I believe there is a good amount of details here to take forward and build to onto our existing infrastructure.

I’ll have more thoughts in the coming days, but these resources are a good place to start.